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Abstract
We study the optimal emission standards under uncertain pollution damages and transaction
costs associated with policy changes. We show that in many situations, the authority should avoid
or reduce the scale of a policy change in the presence of future transaction costs. Then policy
persistence is a rational response of forward-looking policy makers to future transaction costs,
rather than a passive outcome of the current political process.
Economists have long taught that the eÆcient level of euent (or more generally any externality)
occurs when the marginal benets and costs of pollution are equated. Despite this clear policy
advice, there is considerable agreement that economists' inuence on environmental policy making
has been modest (Hahn (2000)). Rather, there is a strong sense that many times it is the political
process, in particular the interaction of interest groups, that shapes the nal design of environmental
policy and any changes in that policy over time (Maloney and McCormick (1982), Keohane, Revesz
and Stavins (forthcoming) and Yandle (1989)).
An important reason for this belief is the predominant presence of policy persistence; the fact
that policies such as pollution standards tend to change slowly if at all. Signicant agreement
is emerging in the literature concerning the diÆculty of reversing a policy once it has been es-
tablished. For example, Coate and Morris (1999) shows that the introduction of a policy invites
agents to undertake actions that allow them to benet from the policy. These benets, in turn,
create incentives for these agents to protect their interests in the form of political pressure and
lobbying. Likewise, Dixit (1996) argues that \policy acts shape the future environment by creating
constituencies that gain from the policy, who will then ercely resist any changes that take away
these gains." Dierent voting rules (Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and Alesina and Drazen (1991))
and aggregation methods (Sen (1977)) can also lead to dierent forms of policy inertia. In these
papers, policy persistence is seen to be an outcome of the political process, replacing economic
eÆciency as the determinant of a policy such as an emission standard.
But, suppose the environmental authority is uncertain of the damages of the euent and is
cognizant of the transaction costs engendered by the political process associated with a future
change in policy. How should the environmental authority set a standard that may need to be
changed when additional information becomes available, when it knows those changes are costly?
This is the question addressed by this paper. Specically, we study the optimal pollution standard
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under uncertain damages and transaction costs associated with policy changes. We show that in
many situations, the authority would avoid or reduce the scale of a policy change, in response to
future transaction costs. The resulting policy persistence is over and above that induced by the
current period transaction costs.
In investigating the consequences of transaction costs on eÆcient emission levels, we recog-
nize that there are many causes of adjustment costs.
1
Various forms of political lobbying and
interest group behavior can generate adjustment costs, although these political groups and their
actions have many additional consequences that cannot be fully captured by the generic modeling
of transaction costs. Further, there are sources of transaction costs that have little or nothing to
do with the political process (such as those related to monitoring and reporting). Thus, although
our model and results complement the work on political economy in environmental economics, the
main contribution is a better understanding of the dynamic consequences of transaction costs, in
all its facets.
In a world of certainty, transaction costs are easily incorporated into setting the eÆcient stan-
dard, resulting in a standard that is closer to the starting point than in a situation without transac-
tion costs. Thus, the presence of current period transaction costs provides some eÆciency basis for
policy persistence. Stavins (1995) examines explicitly how the form of transaction costs aects the
solution in the context of emission permits. Here, we investigate the consequences of these transac-
tion costs in an explicitly dynamic environment, exploring whether the intertemporal eects further
perpetuate policy persistence.
Transaction costs induced by political pressures may be either symmetric or asymmetric. Sym-
metric costs may occur when it is equally diÆcult (costly) to further relax or tighten the new
standard. This may happen if the standard is highly controversial and both sides (environmental-
1
We use \adjustment" costs and \transaction" costs interchangeably throughout the paper.
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ists and industry for example) can be expected to lobby hard for (or against) changes in opposite
directions.
In contrast, asymmetric costs may occur if it is diÆcult to reverse a policy once it is set, but not
particularly diÆcult to make further changes in the same direction. Thus, if a new policy is more
strict than the current standard, then the agency would expect high transaction costs to loosen the
standard in the future, but relatively low costs to further tighten it. The arguments of Coate and
Morris (1999) and Dixit (1996) indicate the existence of this type of asymmetric costs.
In considering the consequences of transactions costs for the eÆcient standard, we nd that if
the costs are symmetric, the optimal new standard depends on the relative probability of future ad-
justments in the two directions. In this case, the added eect of uncertainty is unclear and depends
on the parameters of the model. As uncertainty rises, the policy may demonstrate persistence in
one direction, but not in the other.
However, under asymmetric transaction costs, uncertainty unambiguously enhances the degree
of policy persistence. If the new standard is more strict than the current one, the action of setting
the new standard creates a \policy trend" of tightening standards that will be diÆcult to reverse.
Anticipating this trend, the policy maker will be \cautious" in reducing the allowed emission, and
this caution translates into the new standard being even closer to the existing one. That is, the
current policy becomes more persistent and the starting position matters more under uncertainty.
Essentially when a policy trend already exists, the regulatory agency's optimal choice of the
standard resembles that of an investor conducting irreversible investment under uncertainty, as
illustrated by Arrow and Fisher (1974), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Kolstad (1996). There
is an option value associated with delaying setting the new policy for the agency to gather more
information, but if the agency is forced to act today (possibly due to a legislative mandate), it will
set the policy closer to the starting (i.e. existing) policy level to compensate for the lost option
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value. Thus the policy path consists of a sequence of relatively small adjustments, rather than a
few instances of radical shifts. When currently there is not a policy trend, but a change in policy
will set a trend that cannot be reversed, the agency will become even more cautious, and is more
reluctant to move away from the current position.
In this paper we focus on policy irreversibility, rather than ecological or economic irreversibility
that is usually studied in the real options literature. We broadly dene ecological or economic
irreversibility as diÆculty in reversing one's action due to physical or economic laws, for instance
extinction of species or investment in equipment that has little or no scrap value. Standard real
option theory shows that when a policy leads to ecologically or economically irreversible actions, the
eÆcient timing and scale of the policy are aected by uncertainty and future information (Arrow
and Fisher (1974) and Kolstad (1996)). Pindyck (1998) showed that similar results also hold for
policy irreversibility: uncertainty tends to delay the timing of the new policy. In the only other piece
dealing with policy irreversibility, Farrow and Morel (1999) argued that the way individuals perceive
pollution and frame their decision problems implies dierent directions of policy irreversibility, and
consequently the timing of the policy. In this paper, we show how uncertainty aects the scale
of the new policy when the agency has to act today. Further, we study the optimal policy choice
when the irreversibility is not pre-imposed, but rather is induced by a policy change.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we lay out the basic problem faced by the
regulatory authority, and the dierent forms of adjustment costs. We then develop a simple, stylized
model in Section 2 where policy changes in both directions incur symmetric adjustment costs. We
rst study a simple case where the regulatory authority is uncertain about environmental damages
in the current period, but where all of that uncertainty will be resolved in the second period.
We then extend the model to the more realistic situation where additional information becomes
available in each period, but the uncertainty is never completely resolved. We study asymmetric
4
policy inertia in Sections 3 and 4, and in Section 5, we conclude with a discussion of the implications
of these results generally for policy.
1 Model Setup and Alternative Forms of Adjustment Costs
To focus on policy irreversibility, we assume away ecological and economic irreversibility and con-
sider a ow pollutant that causes environmental damage only in the period it is emitted. Let e
t
be
the emission standard, and consequently the actual emission level
2
in period t, with damage given
by D(e
t
) = 
t
d(e
t
), d
0
 0, d
00
> 0, d(0) = 0 and d
0
(0) = 0. The damage coeÆcient 
t
is a random
variable that is observed at the beginning of period t. The benet of emitting e
t
(i.e. the saved
abatement cost) is given by B(e
t
), with B
00
< 0, B(0) = 0 and B
0
(0) > 0. The information process
facing the regulatory agency is described by the stochastic process f
t
g, t  0.
The regulatory agency chooses a standard for per period emissions to maximize social welfare.
If the policy is not rigid so that the agency can change the standard costlessly, it can simply set
the current period standard as argmax
e
B(e)  
t
d(e). If future information renders this standard
inappropriate, the authority can then set a new standard based on the new information.
3
That is,
the agency's problem is essentially static. However, if the current standard is costly to change in
the future, the agency's problem is dynamic: the current standard should be set to maximize the
expected present value of net payos, subject to the amount of information available and transaction
costs associated with future adjustments to the standard.
We consider two forms of adjustment costs. Under symmetric costs, the adjustment cost for
both more and less strict policy changes is given by c(), dened on [0;1), with c(0) = 0, c
0
> 0
and c
00
 0. The argument of c() measures the absolute value of the policy change. For example,
2
Throughout the paper, we assume that the policy standard is binding: rms will emit up to the allowed level.
3
Excluding economic irreversibility implies that we assume away any possible adjustment costs the rms may
incur responding to policy changes.
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if the current standard is e
0
and the new standard is e
1
, then the adjustment cost is c(je
1
  e
0
j).
We study an extreme form of asymmetric adjustment costs where a policy trend, once set,
cannot be reversed at any cost. In particular, if the policy trend is toward tighter pollution control,
the policy maker faces the following constraint: e(t
1
)  e(t
2
) for t
2
> t
1
. Similarly, if the trend is
toward loosening control, the constraint is e(t
1
)  e(t
2
) for t
2
> t
1
. The assumption of absolute
irreversibility is not critical to our results, but greatly simplies the analysis.
We distinguish between two scenarios under the asymmetric inertia: one where the policy trend
has been set, and one where the new policy change establishes a future trend. We will show that
the agency is more cautious in changing the current policy under the second scenario.
For both the symmetric and asymmetric adjustment cost cases, we rst consider a simpler
problem of full uncertainty resolution in discrete time, where the uncertainty about  is fully
resolved in period two. This simple case provides much of the intuition for our general results.
Specically, in period one, the agency knows that  is Bernoulli: it takes 
L
> 0 and 
H
> 
L
with
equal probability, thus the expected value of  is

 =

L
+
H
2
. In period two, the agency observes
the true value of . Let Æ =

H
 
L
2
, so that 
H
=

 + Æ and 
L
=

   Æ. The parameter Æ is
monotonically related to the variance of  and measures the degree of uncertainty.
We then extend the model to the more realistic setup of continuous time with partial uncertainty
resolution to study the likely policy path overtime. For many environmental problems, uncertainty
about pollution damages may never be fully resolved: human preferences and populations are ever
changing; thus, even as some sources of uncertainty are resolved, new ones arise. A process for
 that has successfully captured this idea and has been widely used (see for example Dixit and
Pindyck (1994)) is described by a Geometric Brownian Motion:
d
t
= 
t
dt+ 
t
dz
t
; (1)
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where dz
t
is the increment of the Wiener process. That is, dz
t
= x(t)
p
dt, where x(t)  N(0; 1)
with cov(x(t
1
); x(t
2
)) = 0 for t
1
6= t
2
. The parameter  measures the \trend" of the future values
of , and  measures the level of uncertainty. According to this formulation, uncertainty about the
future change in  always remains. New information arrives in the form of an observed  value that
aects the expected future level of .
2 Symmetric Adjustment Costs
Some policies face transaction costs to induce change in either direction. It is not uncommon for the
government to be criticized on both fronts when it announces a new regulation. For example, when
the U.S. government announced its new policy to protect the west coast salmon and steelhead,
property owners criticized that the policy went too far, while environmentalists considered the
policy inadequate and announced plans to sue the government (New York Times, 2000).
2.1 Full Uncertainty Resolution
Suppose the current standard is e
0
. Then the risk neutral agency's decision problem is
max
e;e
H
;e
L
B(e) 

d(e)  c(je  e
0
j)
+
1
2

B(e
L
)  
H
d(e
L
)
r
 
c(e  e
L
)
1 + r

+
1
2

B(e
H
)  
L
d(e
H
)
r
 
c(e
H
  e)
1 + r

;
(2)
where e measures the new policy in period one, e
H
is the emission level from period two on if
the realized damage coeÆcient  is low at 
L
, and e
L
is that if  is high at 
H
. Since there is no
uncertainty after period two, we assume that the standard will not be changed.
4
Note that we used
the condition e
L
 e  e
H
which can be veried from the rst order conditions of e
L
and e
H
.
4
Since the adjustment cost function is convex, the policy maker may prefer to adjust the standard gradually.
That is, based on the new information in period two, instead of changing the standard to e
H
or e
L
immediately, the
agency may choose to make the changes over a number of periods. The optimal adjustment rate depends on the
trade o between the saved adjustment cost and the net loss from the suboptimal standard. We assume the gradual
adjustment away since it does not aect our conclusion regarding the eects of uncertainty.
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Obviously the departure of the optimal standard e from that without adjustment costs and
uncertainty depends on the functional forms. Without uncertainty, standard Coastian results apply:
the new standard e is closer to the starting policy as the adjustment cost increases. Our interest is
to investigate whether uncertainty reduces the starting level eect, i.e. whether it implies a further
change from the status quo than the static transaction costs result, or whether it makes the existing
policy more persistent.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the rst order conditions, we nd that regardless of
whether e > e
0
or e < e
0
, i.e., whether the new standard is more or less strict than the initial
standard, the following condition always holds:
de
dÆ
/
c
00
(e
H
  e)d
0
(e
H
)
 A
H
 
c
00
(e  e
L
)d
0
(e
L
)
 A
L
; (3)
whereA
H
= B
00
(e
H
) 
L
d
00
(e
H
) 
r
1+r
c
00
(e
H
 e) < 0 andA
L
= B
00
(e
L
) 
H
d
00
(e
L
) 
r
1+r
c
00
(e e
L
) < 0
are the second order coeÆcients of e
H
and e
L
respectively. Thus the eects of uncertainty depend in
part on the future adjustments needed. For example, if e
H
 e is suÆciently big, i.e. if the standard
would need to be raised signicantly in the future if  = 
L
, the current optimal standard should
also be raised as uncertainty increases. Further, as long as de=dÆ 6= 0, uncertainty enhances policy
persistence in one direction and reduces it in the opposite direction. For example, if de=dÆ > 0,
high initial standards become more persistent than low ones: the agency is more willing to raise
the standard. We will show later that under asymmetric policy inertia, uncertainty enhances
persistence in both directions.
Equation (3) indicates that the sign of de=dÆ depends directly on the functional forms of B(),
d(), and c(), and indirectly on the starting standard e
0
through the optimal e. If B(), d() and c()
are all quadratic, we can verify that
de
dÆ
> 0. In this case, the agency is more willing to increase than
to decrease e as uncertainty increases. The symmetric adjustment cost seems to favor adjustment
8
toward higher emission levels and creates persistence against reducing e. On the other hand, if
c() is quadratic, d() is  linear
5
and B
000
> 0, then
de
dÆ
< 0. The policy becomes more persistent
against increasing standards. In other cases, the sign of de=dÆ may depend on the level of the initial
standard. It is possible that
de
dÆ
> 0 at some starting standard levels and
de
dÆ
< 0 at other levels.
2.2 Partial Uncertainty Resolution
Suppose the initial standard is e
0
. In period t, the agency observes the value of 
t
and chooses
the new standard for this period. Let I
t
measure the magnitude of the policy change. Then the
agency's optimal decision problem is
J(
0
; e
0
)  max
I
E
Z
1
0
[B(e

)  

d(e

)  c(jI

j)] e
 r
d
s.t. d

= 

d + 

dz

_e

= I

; e
0
given:
(4)
From Bellman's Principle of Optimality and Ito's Lemma, we know the optimal policy adjustment
I
t
satises
rJ(
t
; e
t
) = max
I
t

B(e
t
)  
t
d(e
t
)  c(jI
t
j) + 
t
J

+
1
2

2

2
t
J

+ J
e
I
t

: (5)
Thus the rst order condition on I
t
is
c
0
(I
t
) = J
e
(
t
; e
t
) if I
t
 0
c
0
( I
t
) =  J
e
(
t
; e
t
) if I
t
< 0:
(6)
Uncertainty aects the optimal policy I
t
through changing J
e
. Again, I
t
changes in the same
direction as 
2
increases, regardless of whether I
t
> 0 or I
t
< 0. For example, if higher uncertainty
 raises the marginal value of pollution J
e
(; e), then more pollution should be allowed, resulting
in a bigger increase in e
t
if I
t
> 0 or a smaller decrease in e
t
if I
t
< 0. Thus, uncertainty enhances
5
The convex function d() is  linear if 0 < d
00
() < .
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policy persistence in one direction and weakens it in the other direction.
3 Asymmetric Adjustment Costs: Full Uncertainty Resolution
The key feature of asymmetric adjustment costs is that the initial policy change sets a trend that
is diÆcult to reverse. That is, future adjustment costs are endogenously determined by setting
today's standard. Thus even when the starting policy level is the same, the optimal new policies
will dier depending upon whether the policy trend is already set, and, if so, on its direction. To
simplify the analysis, we restrict ourselves to the special case where the policy trend is absolutely
irreversible, while setting a new policy along the trend does not incur any adjustment costs. These
assumptions do not aect our major results.
6
Suppose the policy trend has already been set. Then the decision maker can only change
the standard in the direction of the trend. When new information calls for such a change, we
would expect that she will be reluctant to make the entire change because it cannot be reversed if
future new information proves that the change has been too much. That is, we expect more gradual
changes than without the constraint of the policy irreversibility. This observation is directly parallel
to the conclusions of real option theory on optimal investment decisions. Consider now the scenario
where the policy trend has not been set, but will be once the standard is changed. Then the agency
will be even more reluctant to change the policy since not only can she not reverse the change in
face of new information, but she will be setting a trend that cannot be reversed in the future. Only
particularly strong information will induce her to change the current policy.
We rst study the case of full uncertainty resolution. Partial information will be dealt with
in the next section. Let e

H
= argmax
e
B(e)   
L
d(e) be the optimal emission level, without any
6
We solved the model for a special form of the adjustment cost function that is linear in the policy change, with
the marginal cost higher when the trend is reversed. We obtained similar results, although the resulting conditions
can only be analyzed by numerical methods. This special case is available from the authors upon request.
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policy trend constraint, if  turns out to be 
L
, and e

L
= argmax
e
B(e)   
H
d(e) be the optimal
level if  turns out to be 
H
. Further, we assume that the current emission standard e
0
2 [e

L
; e

H
].
Continuity of the payo function implies that any optimal policy will be in the interval [e

L
; e

H
].
To solve for the government's optimal policy, we employ the logic of Pindyck (1988) and focus
on the eÆcient marginal unit of emissions. In particular, given that B
00
() < 0 and d
00
() > 0, if in
any period it is optimal to emit the xth unit of the pollutant, it must also be optimal to emit all
of the yth units, for y < x. Therefore, we only need to identify the last unit of the pollutant that
should be emitted. If the agency is indierent between emitting this unit and waiting for more
information, then all earlier units should be emitted.
3.1 Optimal Policy Under a Pre-Set Trend
We call the policy trend a polluting trend if the emission standard can only increase, and a cleaning
trend if the emission standard can only decrease. Consider rst the polluting trend. Suppose
the current standard is e 2 (e

L
; e

H
), and we consider whether it is optimal to raise e by one
unit. If we do so, one unit of emission will be added in all future periods since the policy cannot
be reversed. Then the expected present value of the added net benet over all future periods is
du
p
0
(e) =
B
0
(e) 

d
0
(e)
r
. If the government waits one more period and observes that the pollution
damage is low with  = 
L
, then the added benet of raising one unit of emission is
B
0
(e) 
L
d
0
(e)
r
.
Since e < e

H
, the denition of e

H
means that B
0
(e) 
L
d
0
(e) > 0. Thus the agency should raise the
emission level (note that there is no transaction cost for doing this). However, if the damage is high
with  = 
H
, the added benet is
B
0
(e) 
H
d
0
(e)
r
, which is negative since e > e

L
. The optimal decision
is not to raise the emission level, and the added net payo is zero. Thus the present value of the
expected added benet of waiting is du
p
1
(e) =
1
2
1
1+r
B
0
(e) 
L
d
0
(e)
r
. Equating du
p
0
(e) with du
p
1
(e), we
11
get
B
0
(e
p
)
d
0
(e
p
)
= A
p

; (7)
where A
p
=
2r+
H
=


2r+1
> 1, and e
p
is the unique emission level where the agency is indierent between
setting the standard now (at e
p
) and waiting for more information. It is straightforward to verify
that du
p
0
(e) decreases faster in e than du
p
1
(e) (see also Figure 2). Thus for e < e
p
, du
p
0
(e) > du
p
1
(e)
and the agency should adopt the new policy e. If e > e
p
, du
p
0
(e) < du
p
1
(e) and the agency should
wait. The optimal standard should be set at e
p
if e
p
is higher than the current standard. Otherwise,
the current standard is not changed.
Note that without the possibility of future information, the optimal standard satisesB
0
(e

)=d
0
(e

) =

. With future information, A
e
> 1 and e
p
< e

. Therefore, if the agency has to increase the stan-
dard now, policy irreversibility means that it will choose a standard that is more strict than without
future information. That is, the agency is reluctant to move away from the current policy facing
uncertainty and an irreversible trend. Further, A
p
is increasing, and consequently e
p
is decreasing,
in 
H
=

 or the level of uncertainty: Uncertainty thus enhances policy persistence. A
p
is decreasing
in r, and in the extreme, if r = 0 (i.e. without discounting), B
0
(e
p
)=d
0
(e
p
) = 
H
, or e
p
= e

L
. So
without discounting (or the cost of waiting), the agency acts as if the pollutant is causing the
most possible damage, and the current policy e
0
( e

L
) will not be changed until full information
becomes available.
Now consider the cleaning policy trend. Given the current standard e 2 (e

L
; e

H
), we consider
reducing the emission standard by one unit. The present value of the expected net benet of abating
one more unit permanently is du
c
0
(e) = (

d
0
(e) B
0
(e))=r. If the agency waits one period and  turns
out to be 
L
, the payo of abating one more unit is [
L
d
0
(e) B
0
(e)] =r < 0, and the standard should
not be reduced. If  = 
H
, then the payo is (
H
d
0
(e) B
0
(e))=r > 0 and the unit should be reduced.
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Thus the expected present value of waiting one period is du
c
1
(e) = (
H
d
0
(e)   B
0
(e))=(2r(1 + r)).
Equating du
c
0
(e) and du
c
1
(e), we get
B
0
(e
c
)
d
0
(e
c
)
= A
c

; (8)
where A
c
=
2r+
L
=


2r+1
< 1. Thus the optimal policy is e
c
if it is lower than the current emission
standard. Otherwise, it is optimal to maintain the current standard.
Since A
b
< 1, we know e
c
> e

. If the agency decides to reduce the current standard, it will
reduce it by a smaller magnitude due to uncertainty and irreversibility. Again, a higher uncertainty
level implies more policy persistence: A
c
is decreasing and e
c
is increasing in uncertainty. If r = 0,
B
0
(e
c
)=d
0
(e
c
) = 
L
and e
c
= e

H
: without the cost of waiting, the agency acts as if the pollutant is
causing the least possible damage, and does not change the current standard until full information
becomes available.
Figure 1 shows the eects of uncertainty on e
p
and e
c
: they start at the same level e

when
 = 0, and e
p
decreases while e
c
increases as  rises. The arrows indicate allowed policy changes
under each trend. Even though the regulatory agency has the same payo function, its optimal
policies are dierent due to the dierent directions of policy rigidity and future learning. For
example, if the starting condition is at point A, the standard should be raised to e
p
under the
polluting trend, and should not be changed under the cleaning trend. If the starting condition is
at B, the standard should not be changed under either trend. Note that higher uncertainty leads
to increased likelihood that the current policy is not changed, and smaller scale of change if the
change does occur.
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Figure 1: Eects of Uncertainty Under Dierent Policy Trends
3.2 Optimal Trend-setting Policy
Suppose currently a policy trend does not exist, but the new standard, if dierent from the current
one, will set a trend that cannot be reversed. This may be the case if a long-standing policy is
to be changed. Given a current standard e, if the government raises it by one unit, the policy
trend will be a polluting trend, and the standard raised cannot be reversed. Then the (marginal)
expected net payo is du
p
0
(e), as dened in the last section. Similarly, if the government reduces
the standard by one unit, the (marginal) expected payo is du
c
0
(e).
If the government waits one more period and nds that  = 
L
, the optimal standard is e

H
> e.
Thus it will raise the standard by this unit and the marginal benet is
B
0
(e) 
L
d
0
(e)
r
. If  = 
H
, it
will reduce the standard by this unit and the marginal benet is

H
d
0
(e) B
0
(e)
r
. Then the expected
marginal benet of waiting is
du
w
(e) =
1
2
1
1 + r

B
0
(e)  
L
d
0
(e)
r
+

H
d
0
(e) B
0
(e)
r

=
1
2
1
1 + r

(
H
  
L
)d
0
(e)
r

: (9)
Equating du
p
0
(e) and du
w
(e), we obtain the optimal standard if the government decides to
increase the pollution level, given implicitly by
B
0
(~e
p
)
d
0
(~e
p
)
=
~
A
p

; (10)
14
where
~
A
p
=
r+
H
=


r+1
> 1. We can verify that
~
A
p
> A
p
, thus ~e
p
< e
p
. Equating du
c
0
(e) and du
w
(e)
gives the optimal standard if the government decides to decrease the pollution level:
B
0
(~e
c
)
d
0
(~e
c
)
=
~
A
c

; (11)
where
~
A
c
=
r+
L
=


r+1
< 1. We can verify that
~
A
c
< A
c
so that ~e
c
> e
c
.
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal choices ~e
p
and ~e
c
relative to the optimal policy without irre-
versibility, e

. It also compares the optimal policies with those under pre-set policy trends. If
the current standard e
0
< ~e
p
, the optimal policy is to increase the standard to ~e
p
. If e
0
> ~e
c
, the
optimal policy is to reduce the allowed emission to ~e
c
. If ~e
p
 e
0
 ~e
c
, the agency should not change
the current policy. Further, ~e
p
< e
p
and ~e
c
> e
c
: when the new policy sets a trend, the government
is more likely to stick to the current policy, and reduce the size of the policy change when a change
is needed. The reason is that the expected payo from immediately changing the current policy is
the same regardless of whether the policy trend has been set or not. However, the expected payo
from waiting until period two is higher when the policy trend is not set: du
w
(e) = du
p
1
(e) + du
c
1
(e).
Again, from (9), we know du
w
(e) increases as the uncertainty level increases, reducing ~e
p
and raising
~e
c
. The current policy becomes more persistent as uncertainty increases.
4 Asymmetric Adjustment Costs: Partial Uncertainty Resolution
The analysis becomes more complicated with gradual information arrival. Working with this more
realistic case allows us to obtain additional insight about the possible \paths" of environmental
policy: a typical path consists of a sequence of small adjustments, rather than a few instances of
big changes.
15
e
e
p
e
c
O
e
du
p
0
(e)
du
c
0
(e)
du
p
1
(e)
du
c
1
(e)
du
w
(e)
~e
p
~e
c
Figure 2: Optimal Policies Before and After the Policy Trend is Set
4.1 Optimal Policy Under Pre-Set Trend
Given the direction of policy irreversibility, nding the best policy is again similar to the optimal
capacity problem discussed in Pindyck (1988). For each level of pollution coeÆcient , we identify
an optimal level of emission. The current emission is compared with and adjusted to equate this
optimal standard, if the required adjustment is allowed by the policy trend.
Consider rst the polluting trend so that the emission level can only be raised. Suppose the
current emission is e and the authority is deciding whether or not to raise the emission by one unit.
The expected benet of raising this unit now is
dv
p
0
() = E

Z
1
0
e
 rt
[B
0
(e)   
t
d
0
(e)]dt =
B
0
(e)
r
 
d
0
(e)
r   
; (12)
where (1) is substituted for 
t
. Let dv
p
1
() be the expected value of waiting, given . Applying
dynamic programming and Ito's Lemma to dv
p
1
(), we know dv
p
1
() satises
1
2

2

2
dv
p
1
00
() + dv
p
1
0
()  rdv
p
1
() = 0; (13)
where the (single and double) primes stand for the (rst and second order) derivatives with respect
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to . As shown in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the solution to (13) is
dv
p
w
() = A
1


1
+A
2


2
; (14)
where A
1
and A
2
are two constants to be determined by the boundary conditions, and 
1
> 1 and

2
< 0 are the two solutions to the fundamental quadratic:
1
2

2
(   1) +    r = 0: (15)
We can show that 
1
decreases and 
2
increases in the uncertainty level of , 
2
.
If  = 1, the emission causes too much damage and the proposed increase in the standard
will never be adopted. Then dv
p
1
() is the relevant measure of the agent's payo and the expected
payo from waiting is zero. Thus dv
p
1
(1) = 0, which implies that A
1
= 0. To determine A
2
and
the critical 
p
at which the authority is indierent between increasing the standard and waiting, we
use the value matching and smooth pasting conditions, dv
p
1
(
p
) = dv
p
0
(
p
) and dv
p
1
0
(
p
) = dv
p
0
0
(
p
):
A
2
(
p
)

2
=
B
0
(e)
r
 

p
d
0
(e)
r   
(16)
A
2

2
(
p
)

2
 1
=  
d
0
(e)
r   
: (17)
Solving (16) and (17), we obtain

p
(e) =

2

2
  1
B
0
(e)=r
d
0
(e)=(r   )
; A
2
=
B
0
(e)
r(1  
2
)(
p
(e))

2
: (18)
Note that dv
p
0
() is decreasing and linear and dv
p
1
() is decreasing and convex in . If the
observed damage coeÆcient  falls in the \continuation" region, i.e.   
p
(e), dv
p
1
() dominates
dv
p
0
() and the agency should not raise e (i.e. it should wait). If, however,  < 
p
(e), dv
p
0
() is the
relevant measure of value, and the agency should raise e (see also Figure 4). Note that as e is raised,

p
(e) decreases because B
00
(e) < 0 and d
00
(e) > 0. Thus when the observed damage coeÆcient  is
lower than 
p
(), the standard e should be increased until 
p
(e) = . Figure 3 graphs 
p
(e) and
a sample policy path: starting at point A, whenever the observed pollution damage coeÆcient 
17
decreases, the standard e should be increased so that 
p
(e) is reduced to the level of the current .
If, however,  increases, the policy remains unchanged.
Since 
2
is negative and increasing in 
2
, we know

2

2
 1
< 1 and decreases in 
2
. Higher
uncertainty reduces 
p
(e), or enhances persistence of the current policy: from Figure 3, we see
that if the 
p
(e) curve shifts down, it is more likely that the current policy is not changed, and if
changed, the change will be at a smaller scale.
Under the cleaning trend, suppose the current emission level is e and consider the decision of
reducing the standard by one unit. The expected present value of adopting the policy now is
dv
c
0
() =
d
0
(e)
r   
 
B
0
(e)
r
: (19)
The expected value of waiting, dv
c
1
(), satises the following dierential equation:
1
2

2

2
dv
c
1
00
() + dv
c
1
0
()  rdv
c
1
() = 0: (20)
The solution of (20) is dv
c
1
() = D
1


1
+D
2


2
where 
1
> 1 and 
2
< 0 are the two roots of (15).
If  = 0, the pollution causes no damage and the proposed reduction will never be adopted. If we
wait until the next period, no action will be undertaken. The expected marginal value of waiting
is zero: du
c
1
(0) = 0 which implies that D
2
= 0. From the value matching and smooth pasting
conditions, we obtain D
1
=
B
0
(e)
r(
1
 1)(
c
)

1
, and the critical level 
c
:

c
(e) =

1

1
  1
B
0
(e)=r
d
0
(e)=(r   )
; (21)
where 
1
> 0 and is decreasing in 
2
. The concavity of B() and convexity of d() implies that

c
(e) is decreasing in e.
Equation (21) indicates the following decision rule: given any realization of , if the current
standard level is such that  > 
c
(e), the emission standard should be reduced so that the new
critical 
c
equals . If the current standard level is suÆciently low such that 
c
(e)  , the standard
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Figure 3: Optimal Policies Under Pre-Set Trends
is not changed. Figure 3 shows 
c
(e) and a sample policy path starting at point B. As 
2
increases,
both

1

1
 1
and 
c
(e) increases. Again, higher uncertainty enhances the policy persistence.
4.2 Optimal Trend-setting Policy
When the policy trend is not set, given the current standard e and information , the expected
payo of increasing the emission standard by one unit is given by dv
p
0
(), and that of decreasing
the standard is given by dv
c
0
(). Using the same procedure in deriving (13) and (14), the expected
payo of waiting is given by
dv
w
() = F
1


1
+ F
2


2
; (22)
where F
1
and F
2
are two constants to be determined that are independent of  (but depend upon
e).
Let
~

p
(e) be the critical  level for a given e such that the agency is indierent between increasing
the standard from e and waiting, and
~

c
(e) be the indierence level between decreasing from e and
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Figure 4: Optimal Policies Before and After the Policy Trend is Set
waiting. Then value matching and smooth pasting conditions are
dv
p
0
(
~

p
) = dv
w
(
~

p
); dv
p
0
0
(
~

p
) = dv
w
0
(
~

p
) (23)
dv
c
0
(
~

c
) = dv
w
(
~

c
); dv
c
0
0
(
~

c
) = dv
w
0
(
~

c
): (24)
The functions in (23) and (24) are well behaved and we expect that a unique solution exists.
However, the equations cannot be solved analytically. We use a graphical approach similar to
Figure 2 to illustrate the solution. The expected benets of acting now (dv
p
0
() and dv
c
0
()) are the
same with and without the pre-set policy trend. The only dierence lies in the expected benet of
waiting. As we have shown in the case of full uncertainty resolution, we expect that the benet of
waiting is higher without the pre-set trend: at least, the agency can \pretend" that a trend exists
and act accordingly, in which case the benet of waiting is the same as that under the pre-set
trend. That is, we expect that dv
w
()  dv
p
1
() and dv
w
()  dv
c
1
(). Then, as shown in Figure 4,
~

p
(e)  
p
(e), and
~

c
(e)  
c
(e).
Figure 4 is drawn for a particular level of e. It says that if the observed  is lower than
~

p
(e),
that is, if the pollution damage is rather low, the emission standard should be increased by one
20
unit. As in the case of pre-set trend, we expect
~

p
(e) to be decreasing in e. Then as the standard is
raised, the critical level
~

p
decreases. The emission standard should be raised to such a level that
the critical
~

p
equals the current observed . Similarly, given e, if the observed pollution damage
is suÆciently high so that  >
~

c
, the emission standard should be reduced, and consequently
~

c
is
raised, until
~

c
(e) = . The current policy should not be changed if the  value falls between
~

p
(e)
and
~

c
(e). Note that the range of  on which the current policy is not changed is larger than under
a pre-set trend. The agency again is more reluctant to change the current policy if any change
leads to a new trend that cannot be reversed.
5 Policy Implications and Discussion
Since the seminal work of Coase (1960), economists have understood that the presence of transaction
costs aects the eÆcient emission levels. In this paper, we demonstrate that the consequences of
such adjustment costs are more complex than static models depict. Specically, an explicit dynamic
formulation indicates that current and future transaction costs associated with changing a policy
can augment or mitigate the static eects of transaction costs alone. There are a number of
plausible cases in which considerations of future adjustment costs in a dynamic setting lead to
more policy persistence than that a static treatment of adjustment costs generates.
At the beginning of this paper, we noted that political pressures rather than economic eÆciency
criteria are often credited with determining environmental standards. This belief is due, in part,
to the rarity with which emission standards are changed, despite the fact that new information
concerning damages and costs are regularly generated. In this paper, we show that policy persis-
tence can be an eÆcient response to the costs associated with changing policies. That is, policy
persistence may be a rational reaction by forward-looking policy makers to future transaction costs
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(which may be due to political pressures), rather than simply a passive outcome of the current
political process.
The results of this paper hold an important message for those interested in inuencing emission
levels such as environmental or industry lobbyists. If a lobbyist would like to see the regulatory
authority set a tough standard (low emission levels), he should work hard to convince the authority
that it will not be diÆcult to relax the policy in the future if new information becomes available
suggesting that a change is in order.
Our results also yield several insights for policy makers. First, policy makers should recognize
the importance of transaction costs in determining the eÆcient emission standards. Since dierent
transaction costs can yield quite dierent sets of standards (in both level and time path), it is im-
portant that the form of adjustment costs be understood and explicitly considered in policy setting.
Second, to whatever extent possible, the authority should structure its decision making and policy
formation to reduce future adjustment costs associated with changing standards. Third, these
results may have important implications for instrument choice as they suggest that the existence
of transaction costs associated with a particular policy are even more important than previously
understood in choosing among instruments.
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